Securing the Commonwealth: Changing Emergency Preparedness in Kentucky: A Study of the Efforts of the Department of Homeland Security in Changing Emergency Preparedness at the County Level by Cross, Christopher
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
MPA/MPP Capstone Projects Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
2005 
Securing the Commonwealth: Changing Emergency Preparedness 
in Kentucky: A Study of the Efforts of the Department of 
Homeland Security in Changing Emergency Preparedness at the 
County Level 
Christopher Cross 
University of Kentucky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, and the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation 
Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Cross, Christopher, "Securing the Commonwealth: Changing Emergency Preparedness in Kentucky: A 
Study of the Efforts of the Department of Homeland Security in Changing Emergency Preparedness at the 
County Level" (2005). MPA/MPP Capstone Projects. 201. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/201 
This Graduate Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Martin School of Public Policy 
and Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in MPA/MPP Capstone Projects by an 
authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
SECURING THE COMMONWEALTH: 
CHANGING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
IN KENTUCKY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A study of the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security in changing 
emergency preparedness at the county level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christopher Cross 
Public Administration 
University of Kentucky 
Capstone, Spring 2005 
SECURING THE COMMONWEALTH 
  TABLE OF CONTENTS         
 
Executive Summary         3 
 
Introduction          4 
 Statement of the Problem      4 
 Background        6 
  Organizational Change    6 
  Homeland Security—Force for Change  7 
  The Commonwealth of Kentucky   9 
 
Literature Review         12 
 
Methodology          17 
  Research Questions     17 
  Hypothesis      17 
  Unit of Analysis     17 
  Research Tool      18 
  Data Analysis      20 
  Variables      22 
  Limitations      25 
 
Assessment          28 
 Managing Complex Change Model     29 
  Counties that Changed    29 
  Counties that did NOT Change   32 
 Planning and Training      34 
 Threat Assessment       36 
 Logistic Regression Analysis      38 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations       43 
 
Works Cited          47 
 
Appendices          49 
Appendix A         
Changing Preparedness in Kentucky Survey    
 Appendix B         
Regions of the Commonwealth of Kentucky   
 
 
C. Cross 
 
2
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Executive Summary 
 
Statement of the Problem 
During the first 24 to 72 hours following a terrorist attack, local officials and first 
responders will be responsible for dealing with the initial aftermath.  While most 
officials—federal, state, and local—have all acknowledged that domestic 
preparedness must occur at the bottom of the governmental structure, it is unclear if 
any changes to emergency response planning have actually occurred at the local 
governmental level.   
 
 
Research Questions 
The intention of this capstone is to answer the following questions: 
 1. Has change in emergency response planning occurred at the county level? 
 2. Are there regional differences present in terms of organizational change and 
 emergency response planning? 
 
 
Methodology 
A self-designed survey was sent to all county judge executives in Kentucky except 
for Fayette and Jefferson counties where the directors of emergency management 
received the survey (N=120).  The response rate for the survey was 63 percent, which 
is approximately 76 counties.  The data collected from the surveys used SPSS 
statistical software to calculate frequency distributions, correlations, Cronbach’s 
Alpha test, and a logistic regression analysis. 
 
  
Findings 
This study demonstrates that change in the dependent variable (drastic change to 
emergency response plans) can be explained 73.8 percent of the time by the 
independent variables (‘Mitigation Practices,’ ‘level of resistance to change,’ ‘person 
in charge of emergency response,’ long-term vision,’ ‘political barriers,’ and 
‘regional location’).  44 county judge executives stated that they had drastically 
changed their county’s emergency response plans since the events of 9/11.  This study 
also found that counties in the Pennyrile region of the stat are more likely to have 
drastically changed their emergency response plans based on the influence of the 
independent variables which all relate to increasing emergency response.   
 
 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations are suggested: 1) further research needs to be 
conducted to measure factors not captured in this study, 2) focus emergency response 
planning as an organizational change problem and to utilize different planned change 
models for different change agents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The date September 11, 2001, now referred to simply as 9/11, has come to 
represent more than the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the 
attack on the Pentagon in Washington D.C., the crashing of the aircraft in 
Pennsylvania, or the subsequent deaths from anthrax-contaminated mail.  The events 
of 9/11 served as a catalyst for the United States to fundamentally change its 
emergency response planning.  Securing the homeland became the major focus of the 
federal government, while finding the most effective methods and means to protect 
the United States became a priority.  President George W. Bush created the Office of 
Homeland Security to coordinate, assess, and prepare the United States’ internal 
security.  Following the swift creation of the Department of Homeland Security, it 
became clear to many national security observers that state and local response to 
domestic preparedness planning were ignored or merely an afterthought.  This, to 
many onlookers, came as no surprise because the focus on terrorism response 
typically has been on the federal government; however, as many planners and 
thinkers have come to realize, domestic preparedness is a ‘bottom up’ response since 
local responders will be the first to arrive.  Director of the Department of Homeland 
Security, Tom Ridge, said when discussing increasing emergency preparedness that it 
is a “unique notion that the homeland is not secure until the hometown is secure,” 
(“Kentucky” 2004).  
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
During the first 24 to 72 hours following an attack, local officials and first 
responders will be responsible for dealing with the initial aftermath of an attack.  
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When an attack occurs, local governments and municipalities can offer early 
leadership, help and information.  While most officials—federal, state, and local—
have all acknowledged that domestic preparedness must occur at the bottom of the 
governmental structure, it is unclear if any changes to emergency response planning 
have actually occurred at the local governmental level.   
 The question of whether changes to emergency response planning have 
occurred arises from the fact that many local officials throughout the United States 
believe they are unlikely to be affected by a terrorist attack; however, if only one 
thing has been learned from the events of 9/11, it is that governments at all levels and 
in all areas of the country must begin to think about the unthinkable.  Terrorists, 
whether they are attempting to make broad political statements or small local ones, 
seek to instill fear in the populace and to alter peoples’ lives.  This is why, no matter 
how far away or unthinkable the threat of terror may seem, local governments’ 
emergency response planners must maintain a broad focus and plan for the 
unthinkable.  The question becomes how can one assess local government 
preparedness hundreds of miles from ground zero?   
Many researchers have attempted to approach the question of local 
preparedness by conducting a threat assessment.  While threat assessments reveal 
infrastructure weaknesses, emergency response plan failures, or other vulnerabilities, 
they fail to assess the fundamental problem all businesses, organizations and agencies 
face—Change.  It is easy to acknowledge that change needs to occur, but it is difficult 
to effectively manage the needed changes within an organizations’ environment.  This 
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is the situation being brought about by the new environment of global terrorism: 
organizations and governments need to change. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Organizational Change 
 
Change comes in many shapes and sizes—sometimes change is incremental 
and rarely noticed, while other times change is large and dramatic.  The importance of 
organizational change is matched equally with the difficulty in successfully 
completing change.  The study of change is not new—how and why people change 
has been the focus of research for some time.  What is change?  Change involves 
“movement between some discrete and rather fixed ‘states,’ so that organizational 
change is a matter of being in State 1 at Time 1 and State 2 at Time 2,” (Kanter, 1992, 
p.9).  Organizational change can be perceptual or empirical.  It can be perceptual 
because much of the change experience is based on point of view.  The point of view 
of those who are creating change as an intentional process will be different from those 
on the receiving end of the change process.  It can be empirical because any 
organization is defined in its operations by the presence of a set of characteristics 
associated with enduring patterns of behavior “both of the organization as an entity 
and of people involved in it,” (Kanter, 1992, p.10).  When the need for organizational 
change arises or an organization decides to change the actions that will take place will 
appear as planned change initiatives.  Planned change consists of activities that are 
intentional and goal oriented.  The goals of undergoing planned change are:  
1) It seeks to improve the ability of the organization to adapt to changes in its 
environment 
2) It seeks to change employee behavior (Robbins, 2003, p.558) 
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It is important to note that even the best planned change initiatives taken by an 
organization can and will be met with resistance.  One of the most well documented 
findings from studies of individuals and organizational behavior is that “organizations 
and their members resist change” (Robbins, 2003, p.559).  Resistance to change, 
while extremely difficult to overcome, is necessary for the survival of an 
organization.  If resistance to change were absent from an organization, 
“organizational behavior would take on the characteristics of chaotic randomness,” 
(p.559).  It is important also to note that a change may appear to only produce 
minimal resistance upon the initiation of the change; however, marked overt 
resistance may not appear until weeks or months later. 
Homeland Security—Force for Change 
 
 The creation of the Department of Homeland Security was in itself a drastic 
bureaucratic change that initiated major ripple effects on local governments 
throughout the United States.  Local governments’ environment changed with the 
push for increased preparedness by the DHS.  Local governments were pressured to 
change their emergency procedures and security procedures both by the federal 
government and local constituents.  It is unclear whether the outside forces to change 
were sufficient enough to overcome the resistance to break from the norm.  
Traditional organizational change theory argues that the politics of change suggests, 
“that the impetus for change is more likely to come from outside change agents, 
employees who are new to the organizations, or from managers slightly removed 
from the main power structure,” (Robbins, 2003, p.563).  Traditionally, acting as 
change agents, “they can symbolically convey to various constituencies—
C. Cross 
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stockholders, suppliers, employees, customers—that they are on top of problems and 
adapting to a dynamic environment,” (p.563).  Change is unique when assessing the 
creation of the DHS and local preparedness because change has to occur at different 
levels of government—federal, state, and then local—at the same time while 
overcoming different restraining forces.  Change theorist Kurt Lewin looked at 
organizational change in terms of opposing forces.  Lewin stated “it is of great 
practical importance for any type of social management that production levels are 
quasi-stationary equilibrium which can be changed either by adding forces in the 
desired direction or by diminishing opposing forces,” (Lewin, 1951, p.217). 
 
 
Figure 1: Robbins, 2003, p.565 
 
When one takes Lewin’s theory and begins to examine the efforts of the DHS, 
it is unclear if this department has been successful at adding driving forces in the 
desired direction of increased local preparedness. While many can cite the effects the 
DHS had on the federal government and its bureaucratic agencies, it is unclear 
exactly how successful DHS has been in changing local governments.  The DHS’s 
most apparent forces for change at the local level have been financial incentives and 
grant competition; however, are those driving forces sufficient in causing the desired 
organizational change that is needed to increase preparedness at the local level?  
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Should the DHS solely be responsible for providing driving forces for change to 
occur at the local response level? 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky 
 
 Kentucky is no stranger to terrorism or terrorists.  In a speech, former 
Governor Paul Patton said that the “Militant militia groups, the Ku Klux Klan, drug 
cartels, organized gangs, money laundering, drug trafficking, school shootings and 
the recent shocking murder of a county sheriff are all examples of terrorist acts” the 
Commonwealth has faced in its storied past (“Homeland” 2002).  Fifty years ago, 
only 37 percent of Kentuckians lived in urban areas.  Today, more than half the 
Commonwealth’s population resides in an urban (city) environment.  The 
Commonwealth of Kentucky is quite unique in the number and diversity of its local 
government entities.  The Commonwealth is a national leader with its 120 counties, 
435 cities and towns, 15 area development districts, 1,300 special districts and 176 
school districts (Miller, 1994, p.269).   
 Kentucky’s county governments are similar to many local governments 
throughout the United States because their leaders believe the possibility of a terrorist 
attack seems unlikely and almost impossible—making an increase in the driving 
forces nonexistent.  The perception of the need to change Kentucky’s county 
governments has been viewed as small; however this perception has not stopped the 
DHS from trying to force preparedness changes to occur.  The Department of 
Homeland Security has made available more than $4.4 billion nationwide in funding 
for grants since March 1, 2003, directed toward first responder groups, both at the 
state and local governmental levels, to enhance response and preparedness 
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capabilities.  In the 2003 fiscal year, the state of Kentucky ranked 20th among the 50 
states and the District of Columbia in per capita expenditures by the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (Alford, 2003).  The Department of Homeland Security spent 
or earmarked “$126.4 million in Kentucky for grants, contracts, and salaries from 
Oct. 1, 2002, through Sept. 30, 2003,” (Alford, 2003).  The exclusive use of financial 
incentives as a driving force to obtain the desired changes in local preparedness has 
not produced conclusive evidence that change has occurred.   
 Roughly thirty dollars and seventy cents was spent per resident of Kentucky in 
2003 for Homeland Security.  As has been the national trend, local governments are 
increasingly responsible for fulfilling and paying for federal initiatives.  This has 
become painfully obvious in the spending for Homeland Security initiatives.  The 
appropriation cycles of federal funding have been erratic causing extreme “burdens 
on local governments to continue preparedness activities when there is no federal 
funding, and to thoughtfully and strategically apply several years of federal funds and 
millions of dollars at one time,”(Alford, 2003).  When federal funding is available, 
most of the spending is limited to the acquisition of technology.  The implementation, 
training, and personnel increases have to be met by local government budgets.   
 In 2003 the Kentucky counties that received the greatest amount of homeland 
security funding were Franklin, Jefferson, Boone, Fayette, and Kenton with the 
maximum going to Franklin in the amount of $69.2 million.  That large amount of 
funding to Franklin County placed its per capita spending at $1,440.63 per resident 
(Alford, 2003).  Pendleton County, which ranked last in state spending per capita 
spent 43 cents per resident, Grant County 56 cents, Garrard County 46 cents, Green 
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County 52 cents and Lincoln County 60 cents (Alford, 2003).  Spending in Kentucky 
at the county level can serve as a model of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
Homeland Security funding of preparedness initiatives.  What is unclear is if the 
efforts and spending of the Department of Homeland Security have been sufficient 
enough to act as a driving force for changing preparedness in Kentucky.   
C. Cross 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Organizations are consciously coordinated social units, composed of two or 
more people that function on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common goal 
or set of goals.  Similarly, governments (local, state or federal) are political 
organizations that are comprised of individuals and institutions that are authorized to 
formulate public policies and conduct public affairs.  While there are very few 
organizational theorists that apply the various organizational change theories to 
government, the theories can be applied to any organization whether it is business, 
government or non-profit.  Perhaps the most important organizational change theorist 
is Kurt Lewin and his force field theory.   
From the 1950s until early 1980s the field of organizational change was 
dominated by Lewin’s planned change approach, which he wrote about in his book 
Field Theory in Social Science.  Though often portrayed by critics as a simplistic 
approach to change, Lewin’s is comprised of complex elements.  The first complex 
element is field theory that is an approach to understanding the complexity of group 
behavior and the field in which it occurs.  Field theory focuses on the struggle 
between driving forces (forces that direct behavior away from the status quo) and 
restraining forces (forces that hinder movement from the existing equilibrium) and 
change is the result of altering one or both of these forces.  The second element is 
Lewin’s three-step model seen below.  
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Figure 2: Robbins, 2003, p.564 
Lewin believed that the stability of human behavior is based on a quasi-stationary 
equilibrium supported by a complex field of driving and restraining forces.  Lewin 
argued that equilibrium needs to be unfrozen before new behavior can be adopted.  
The movement step is where the change occurs.  The final step is refreezing.  
Refreezing seeks to stabilize the organization or group at the new equilibrium.  For 
this model of unfreezing, movement, and refreezing Lewin believed that planned 
change must occur for the model to be successful.  Leaders of organizations must be 
able to recognize or understand how to use driving forces to upset the equilibrium 
within their organization in order to begin the change process.  Thus, what Lewin was 
really discussing in his model was that leaders must use some kind of planned change 
model to successfully go through the three steps of the change process. 
 As noted by researcher Bernard Burnes, the planned change model created by 
Lewin has begun to attract criticism about its appropriateness and usefulness 
especially from the culture-excellence school of thought.  Proponents of culture-
excellence argue “that Western organizations are too bureaucratic, inflexible, and 
slow to change,” (Burnes, 2003, p.888).  The culture-excellence approach calls for 
organizations to adopt flexible cultures that promote innovation, entrepreneurship and 
that “encourage bottom-up, continuous and cooperative change,” (p.888).   
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 At the same time that the debate between Lewin’s theories and the culture-
excellence theory takes place, others were assessing the outcomes of change from a 
power and political decision-making process.  These change researchers believe “the 
objectives and outcomes of change programs are more likely to be determined by 
power struggles than by any process of the rational decision-making method” 
(Pfeffer, 1992).  According to Pfeffer, power is central to organizational change.  
Building on this theory of change the process approach emerged in the 1980s.  
Researchers that support this theory argue, “change is continuous, unpredictable, and 
essentially political in nature,” (Pettigrew, 2000).  
 In a 1985 paper, Tushman and Romanelli described an evolutionary process of 
punctuated change models (Sastry, 1997, p.238).  With the model of punctuated 
change, researchers have created a way to differentiate and reconcile divergent 
models of change.  In doing this they were able to show how the same organization 
may “exhibit two different modes of behavior—adaptive and inertial—at different 
times,” (p.238).  Punctuated change models provide a means for “integrating the 
strategic management and adaptationist views of organizations as readily 
changeable,” (p.238). 
 Researchers Kanter, Stein, and Jick point out that regardless of the particular 
change models used to explain the change process, there are problems unique to 
change.  They believe that there are several reasons it is difficult for an organization 
to undergo change.  The first reason they recognize is that it is hard to make changes 
stick.  The second is there are clear limitations to managerial action in making 
change.  The third is to attempt to carry out programmatic continuing change through 
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isolated single efforts that are likely to fail because of the effects of system context.  
The fourth problem is the need for change that may make it harder to change (Kanter, 
1992, p.5).   
 Once you begin to understand the various models of change and their unique 
problems, then you can begin to make organizational changes.  Researcher William 
A. Medina argues that knowing the model of change and being aware of the problems 
are not the only things needed to undergo successful change.  He argues that before 
attempting change you must first understand the organization to select the most 
successful approach to changing (Medina, 1982).  Though his research focuses on 
how it is necessary to understand the organization to implement change at the federal 
government level, it has implications on change occurring within any branch or 
bureaucracy within any level of government.   
After understanding the organization where the change will take place, there 
are two models that can be used to successfully implement change.  The first is the 
Managing Complex Change model which researchers Adams, Kingsley, and Smith 
used to examine the change process within the Brandeis University’s Center for 
Youth and Communities.  The Managing Complex Change model draws upon a five-
element framework that can help practitioners manage the change process.  This 
model has been applied to change efforts in many communities and it has been found 
to be an excellent tool for successfully understanding and implementing 
organizational change (Adams, 2005).  When looking at the model it demonstrates 
that you need all five elements present for change to occur.  Those five steps are 
Vision, Skills, Incentives, Resources, and an Action Plan.  When one or more of the 
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steps are missed or not fulfilled, the change agents may experience confusion, 
anxiety, gradual change, frustration, or false starts. 
While the Managing Complex Change model is helpful when initially 
assessing what factors are needed to undergo a successful change process, John 
Kotter’s model for transforming organizations provides a more step-by-step guide to 
change.  Kotter’s model has been widely used and is referenced throughout 
management literature.  He utilizes seven distinct steps to be successful in the change 
process.  Those steps are (1) establishing a sense of urgency, (2) creating the guiding 
coalition, (3) develop a vision and strategy, (4) communicating the change vision, (5) 
empowering broad-based action, (6) generating short-term wins, and (7) anchoring 
new approaches in the culture (Kotter, 1996).   
While researchers disagree on the best approach to successfully implementing 
organizational change they all agree that successful change is a difficult process.  A 
process that requires planning, management skills and leadership focused on what the 
changed result should be.  Change does not occur when a leader decides changes need 
to be made.  Successful change requires leaders that can successfully balance the 
driving and resisting forces for change.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Objective 
The objective of this capstone project is to use the issue of Homeland Security 
as a platform to examine change.  The subsequent data analysis is used to assess if the 
events of 9/11 and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security drive the 
need to change emergency preparedness planning at the county government level.   
 
Research Questions 
 1. Has change in emergency response planning occurred at the county level? 
 2. Are there regional differences present in terms of organizational change and 
 emergency response planning? 
 
Hypothesis  
 The null hypothesis of this study is  
  H0: Matters relating to Homeland Security do not drive the need to 
   change emergency response preparedness at the county  
   government level. 
 
 which is tested against the alternative hypothesis: 
 
  H1: Matters relating to Homeland Security do drive the need to  
  change emergency response preparedness at the county government 
  level.  
 
Unit of Analysis  
 The specific population of interest for this study is the 120 counties that make 
up the Commonwealth of Kentucky.   In order to generalize about the entire state of 
Kentucky’s county government level of preparedness, the sample surveyed were are 
all County Judge Executives with the exception of Kentucky’s two City/County 
merged governments.  In the case of Lexington-Fayette and Louisville-Jefferson, the 
Directors of Emergency Response/Management were surveyed.  
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Research Tool  
 The research will be conducted for this study using an original survey 
designed by the author and descriptive data provided by the National Association of 
Counties.  A survey was chosen as the main data collection tool because it can 
accurately measure people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviors quickly and consistently 
from numerous respondents.  In creating the survey, the author took into account the 
possibility that question order could affect the responses of the survey.  In ordering 
the questions, the author considered the impact of each question on the respondents 
and their likelihood to complete the survey.  Questions that ask sensitive information 
were left until the end.  This was done deliberately to help avoid having the 
respondent’s fear that the purpose of the survey is to check-up or criticize them.  The 
questions are all closed-ended questions (a question with response alternatives 
provided) with the exception of question 32 that was an opened-ended question 
(question with no response alternatives provided for the respondents).  The closed-
ended questions offer response alternatives in three forms: Multiple Choice, Likert 
Scales, and Yes/No responses.  The questions and alternative responses are varied 
throughout the survey to avoid a response set, or straight-line responding.  The 
questions that require more thought appear first in the survey while the less involved 
questions are left at the end in an attempt to overcome possible respondent fatigue.   
 The survey questionnaire requests information about each county’s emergency 
response plans, the level of resistance to change they have experienced, sources of 
resistance to change, and management techniques utilized for successfully changing.  
Specifically in their emergency response plans questions will be targeted at how 
efficiently those plans address: 
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Infrastructure—critical infrastructures are not interdependent but 
rather dependent upon others.  Critical infrastructure examined in 
this study will include agriculture, food, water, public health, 
information and Tele-communications, energy, transportation, 
and banking and finance.  
Authority and powers—following a terrorist event who is in 
charge, who can make decisions to coordinate county services to 
save lives and minimize infrastructure losses must be addressed 
in the emergency response plan and understood by officials.   
Departmental roles and responsibilities—it is important for 
every employee and department of a county to fully understand 
their roles and responsibilities in helping manage the situation.  
The public works employees must know exactly what there 
duties are during an emergency just like the Judge-Executive or 
Sheriff.   
Training and planning—preparation and proper responding to a 
disaster or terrorist event.  A comprehensive training program 
must be designed to ensure that they are able to cope effectively 
with any emergency.   
 
The survey was designed through careful study and analysis of Armando 
Bevelacqua’s “Terrorism Handbook for Operational Responders,” Juliette Kayyem’s 
“First to Arrive: State and Local Responses to Terrorism,” the Kentucky League of 
Cities State Homeland Security Assessment Program and incorporates two specific 
organizational change models.  The change models are Kurt Lewin’s organizational 
change theory and the managing complex change models.  The survey did this by 
asking questions that were applicable to emergency response planning and related to 
change theory.  An example of this was question 3 which asked, “What barriers to 
change have your emergency response plans had to overcome?”  This question 
provided possible answers that research has seen as barriers to changing emergency 
response preparedness like political, financial, limited skills, and limited resources.  
(See Appendix A for the complete survey) 
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Response Rate  
 Response rate refers to the proportion of respondents selected for participation 
in a survey who actually participate through responding.  If this proportion is low 
because possible respondents have refused to participate in taking the survey the 
ability to make statistical inferences for the sample (which include 120 counties) may 
limit this project.  The actual response rate for this project was 63 percent, which is 
approximately 76 counties.  To help insure such a high response rate an introductory 
letter was sent one week prior to the mailing of the survey.  The survey was mailed 
with a cover letter that explained the project, urged participation, and included a self-
addressed return envelope (postage-paid).  The initial surveys had a 2-week return 
deadline.  Those counties that did not respond within the 2-week deadline were sent a 
reminder postcard that let them know they still had time to get their survey included 
in the study. Several additional surveys were sent out to counties who had lost or 
misplaced their original copy and had requested the extra survey. Unfortunately, time 
ran out and prevented a complete additional mailing of the survey to those counties 
that had not responded.   
 
Data Analysis  
To attempt to answer the research questions posed by this capstone project 
there were two analytical approaches utilized.  Those approaches while different, both 
were assessed using the statistical software SPSS 12.0 to calculate and run the various 
statistical models.  The first approach utilized the frequency distributions of the 
various organizational change elements to understand the problems and difficulties 
local officials face in changing and improving emergency preparedness.  This was 
done by dividing the respondents into two groups; those who stated that they had 
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drastically changed their emergency response plans since the events of 9/11 and those 
who did not.  Then using the survey questions that measured if the respondents were 
using the Managing Complex Change model’s five steps (Vision, Skills, Incentives, 
Resources, Action Plan), percentages of usage were calculated and placed in the 
model.  This may help various change agents better understand how to overcome 
resistance to change because this model requires change agents to accomplish five 
steps before the change process is complete and successful.   
The second approach utilized the logistic (dummy variable) regression 
analysis to assess the overall likeliness of Kentucky’s counties to change their 
emergency preparedness as a result of the efforts of the Department of Homeland 
Security and the events of September 11, 2001.  A regression analysis attempts to 
discover if a relationship exists between a dependent variable and various 
independent variables.  Logistic (dummy variable) regression was used in this 
analysis because the dependent variable in this project was based on a binary 
response to explain variation.  A binary response typically is a question that renders a 
yes or no response.  In doing social science research, binary responses are coded 
numerically—‘yes’ responses are coded as 1 and ‘no’ responses are coded as 0 or as 
dummy variables as they are typically called.  Thus each county is assigned a score of 
1 or 0 depending on whether or not they answered yes or no to the question “Have 
you drastically changed your emergency response plans since the events of 9/11?”   
The logistic regression model predicts the “probability that Y equals 
1,”(Johnson, 2001, p.412).  A logistic regression uses “a non-linear model in which 
the log odds on one response are opposed to another is the dependent variable,” and 
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uses a curve to “show that X increases the probability that Y equals 1 
increases,”(p.415).  Or in other words, the probability that counties drastically 
changed their emergency response plans changes with changes in the independent 
variables.   
 
∆ Dependent Variable 
 A dependent variable is some variable or action that is thought to be 
influenced, affected, or caused by other phenomena.  The dependent variable used in 
the logistic regression analysis was those counties that drastically changed their 
emergency response plans since the events of September 11, 2001.    
 
∆ Independent Variable  
 An independent variable is a factor that is thought to influence, affect, or 
cause change within the dependent variable.  There were several independent 
variables assessed in this study: 
1. Political barriers—was defined as one of the possible responses 
respondents could identify as being a barrier to change they had to 
overcome.  It was measured using a question that specifically 
asked if Political barriers had been overcome to change emergency 
response plans. 
2. Level of resistance to change—was defined numerically with the 
numeric answer of 5 being significant level of resistance they had 
experienced and an answer of 0 as none.  It was measured using a 
Likert scale ranging 0 to 5 that asked respondents to identify the 
level or resistance they experienced. 
3. Person in charge of emergency response—was defined using 5 
possible responses; Judge Executive, Director of Emergency 
Response, Police Chief/Sheriff, Fire Chief, or other.  It was 
measured by the asking the respondents who is in charge of the 
county’s response operations following an emergency event. 
4. Long-term vision—was defined as having a long-term written 
vision of where judge executives would want their county’s level 
of emergency preparedness.  It was measured using a question that 
requested a yes or no response.  
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5. Personnel changes—was defined as changes that had been made 
since the completion of a threat assessment.  It was measured using 
a question that requested a yes or no response.   
6. State Regions (Bluegrass, Western, Eastern, and Pennyrile)—
where defined using physiological mapping.  It was measured by 
coding the surveys prior to mailing them and then identifying them 
in the data set.   
7. Mitigation Practices—was defined as various issues that 
demonstrate changes in emergency response planning.  It was 
measured using 18 questions utilized in the survey.   
 
The seventh independent variable ‘Mitigation Practices’ is a variable that was created 
by combining eighteen other independent variables.  The combination of the variables 
was necessary in order to run a logistic regression analysis because this study had so 
few respondents that using a large number of independent variables would have 
forced the regression to give up degrees of freedom.  Degrees of freedom help 
determine if a relationship is statistically significant.  The combination of the eighteen 
variables together was accomplished by using several statistical processes.  All of the 
independent variables along with the dependent variable were put into a correlation 
matrix, which is a table that shows the correlations among a number of variables.  
Those variables that had a positive correlation of at least 40 percent or higher were 
identified and compared to each other using Cronbach’s Alpha test.  Cronbach's 
Alpha measures how well a set of items (or variables) measures a single construct 
(“SPSS”).  Cronbach's Alpha is not a statistical test - it is a coefficient of reliability 
(or consistency) test.  The formula for Cronbach’s Alpha test is: 
 
In this equation the N is equal to the number of variables (18 in this study) and the r-
bar is the average of the correlation among the variables.  As the number of variables 
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increases, so does that of Cronbach’s Alpha (“SPSS”).  The new variable that was 
created was termed ‘Mitigation Practices’ because all of the combined independent 
variables related to homeland security mitigation issues. 
Mitigation is the process of preventing disasters or reducing related hazards and is 
the cornerstone of emergency management.  Mitigation methods for limiting damages 
can be as simple as placing a fuse box higher on a wall in a flood-prone area, or as 
costly as strengthening a building's structure to withstand an earthquake.  In terms of 
homeland security, mitigation methods can be improving the security of critical 
infrastructures, increasing planning or understanding the possible vulnerabilities an 
area may face.  Thus the variable ‘Mitigation Practices’ is the sum of the variables:  
1. Aftermath 9/11—this variable was created using question 1 of the survey.  It 
asked, “Since the aftermath of 9/11, how have issues/concerns of security for 
your county changed?”  It was measured using the response alternatives 
greatly, somewhat, very little, or not at all. 
2. Focus on planning—this variable was created using question 10 of the survey.  
It asked, “In terms of your day-to-day operations, how often do you focus on 
emergency response planning?”  It was measured using the response 
alternatives daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, or randomly. 
3. Sense of threat—this variable was created using question 5 of the survey. It 
asked, “What has motivated the change to your emergency response planning 
to take place?”  Respondents had a selection of 5 response alternatives and 
were asked to circle all that applied.  Sense of threat was one of those 
alternatives.  It was measured as a yes or no variable—yes if the respondents 
circled it or no if they did not.   
4. Community interest—this variable was created using question 5 of the survey. 
It asked, “What has motivated the change to your emergency response 
planning to take place?”  Respondents had a selection of 5 response 
alternatives and were asked to circle all that applied.  Community interest was 
one of those alternatives.  It was measured as a yes or no variable—yes if the 
respondents circled it or no if they did not. 
5. Level of cooperation—this variable was created using question 11 of the 
survey.  It asked, “What is the level of cooperation between your county and 
neighboring counties regarding Homeland Security planning?”  This was 
measured using the response alternatives excellent, good, average, fair, 
poor/non-existent, no answer, or not necessary.  
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6. Level of commitment—this variable was created using questioning 13 of the 
survey.  It asked, “What has been the level of commitment by your 
department heads in implementing new Homeland Security emergency 
response plans?”  This was measured using a Likert scale 0 to 5 were 0 equal 
poor commitment and 5 equaled outstanding commitment.  
7. Agricultural, water, information services, banking and financial, and energy 
infrastructure—these variables were created using question 9 of the survey.  It 
asked, “please circle the three sectors of critical infrastructure in which your 
county has taken the least steps to improve preparedness.” Respondents had a 
selection of 8 response alternatives the six listed were most related to the other 
variables used to create the Homeland Security issues variable.  All these 
alternatives were measured as a yes or no variable—yes if the respondents 
circled it or no if they did not. 
8. Chemical, biological, bombings, radiological, agricultural, hostage taking and 
financial types of terror—these variables were created using question 14 of 
the survey that asked, “What types of terrorism is your county most or least 
prepared for?”  These were measured using a Likert scale 0 to 4 was 0 equaled 
least prepared and 5 equaled most prepared. 
 
All of these variables together received a Cronbach’s Alpha reliability score of 78.4 
percent indicating that they are related to one another.   
 
Limitations of the Study 
 There are several limitations of this study.  The first limitation is in regards to 
this study’s response quality.  Response quality refers to “the extent to which 
responses provide accurate and complete information,”(Johnson, 2001, p.291).  This 
study utilized a mail survey, which is somewhat responsible for the study having 
problems regarding response quality.  Some of those problems were the use an open-
ended question, the fact that there was no researcher there to probe for additional 
information, that the survey could only ask a limited number of questions so there 
was no way to control the sequence the respondents answered the questions or control 
who answered, contributed or influenced the respondent’s answers.  This last problem 
provides one of the greatest external threats to this study.  There was some evidence 
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in categorizing the respondent’s surveys that county judge executives may not have 
been the person filling out the survey—the evidence was inconclusive.  This is a 
threat to the validity of the study because the truthfulness or quality of the response 
may vary drastically.  If a director of emergency response or planning filled out the 
survey instead of the judge executive of the county their perspective of cooperation, 
commitment, and resistance to change may differ greatly than the perspective that 
may be shared among judges.   
The next limitation was that the population being studied was small and only 
garnered a response rate of 63 percent.  The small response rate is an internal validity 
threat because it reduces the ability to generalize across counties (it is important to 
note that regional response were proportional).  There was another limitation in 
regards to the logistic regression.  The Cronbach’s Alpha test for reliability only 
received a score 78.4 percent.  This percentage of reliability is below the 
recommended 80 percent score typically preferred in social science research.   
 The final limitation of this study is in measuring the dependent variable.  As 
already discussed the dependent variable was based on a yes or no question which 
asked respondents if they had drastically changed their emergency response plans 
since the events of 9/11.  What this question and the survey failed to capture was if 
respondents answered no, why they did so.  Was it because they made changes to 
their emergency response plans prior to 9/11 causing them not to perceive a great 
threat in a post 9/11 world?  Or are they currently changing their plans and answered 
no because they have not completed the change?  These possibilities make it hard to 
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generalize about the counties that did not drastically change their emergency response 
plans.   
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ASSESSMENT 
 
 Change is difficult, but it is not change alone that is responsible for the 
problems and difficulties of undergoing organizational change. Rather, it is most 
often the ineffective management of change by those called upon to implement 
change that causes the stress and problems of undergoing change.  Thus, most 
managers who are responsible for bringing about change do not understand the 
complexity of managing change.  With this in mind, county judge executives were 
asked a series of questions on the ‘Changing Preparedness Survey’ aimed at modeling 
complex change management by local officials throughout Kentucky in changing 
their emergency response planning in response to the Department of Homeland 
Security.  Those questions were 3d, 3e, 5, 22, and 31.  Each question targeted a step 
of the Complex Change model.  For example question 31 asked “did you use an 
action plan of some kind for guidance in making changes to your emergency response 
plans?”  Respondents had to select from the response alternatives yes, no, or not 
applicable (See Appendix A for complete survey).   
 The responding sample of county judge executives was divided into two 
groups.  Of the 76 county judge executives that responded to the survey, 44 county 
judge executives stated that they had drastically changed their emergency 
preparedness plans since the events of September 11, 2001.  By stating that they had 
drastically changed their emergency response those judges are noting that they had 
embraced or planned change when dealing with emergency planning.  30 judges 
stated that no change had occurred and 2 respondents failed to answer the question.  
Those judges that stated that they had not drastically change their emergency 
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response plans may have answered that way for three reasons—they had changed pre-
9/11, they were in the process, or they were rejecting/neglecting to change.   
 
Counties that Changed 
 
The 44 judges that had changed their emergency preparedness plans were 
placed into the Managing Complex Change model to assess how well they have or are 
managing the change process. Researchers Adams, Kingsley, and Smith state that if 
“people and organizations do not learn how to effectively manage change, they will 
find themselves managed by the changes,” (Adams, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 3: <http://elsmar.com/Discovering_Change/sld018.htm> 
  
∆ Vision for Change 
 Vision provides a detailed overall picture of what the efforts of change will 
produce at the end of the change process.  The vision is crucial to the change process 
because it describes what an organization is trying to change and what will be 
occurring among employees and management before, during and after change.  When 
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the vision is clear and is developed by key stakeholders and is communicated to all 
levels of an organization “there is increased likelihood that people and institutions can 
find their places in the process and work in concert toward common goals,”(Adams, 
2005).  Of the 44 judges that changed, 32.6 percent answered no to question 22 of the 
survey indicating that they do not have a long-term vision of the change process.  
What this means, in terms of the Managing Complex Change model, is that 32.6 
percent of judges executive and employees within the county could be experiencing 
confusion in attempting to change their emergency response plans.  This conclusion is 
drawn from looking at Figure 3 and selecting the second row that is missing vision.  
By selecting that row and following it across from left to right the model predicts that 
confusion will when undergoing change without a vision.   
 
∆ Skills for Change 
 The issue of having the necessary skills for change addresses the question of 
whether or not the people in an organization who are focusing on change “possess the 
abilities needed to make the vision happen at a high level of quality,” (Adams, 2005).  
When the necessary skills are lacking the people involved in the change process 
regularly find they experience stress and anxiety as Figure 3 illustrates.  Based on 
responses to survey question 3d, only 19.6 percent of the 44 county judge executives 
that changed indicated that they do not have the necessary skills in changing their 
emergency response plans—80.4 percent had the necessary skills for change.  Thus, 
stress and anxiety felt among the judges and county employees is minimal.   
 
∆ Incentives for Change 
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 Incentives are means to create ownership and buy-in among all players 
involved in the change process.  In the end, incentives should answer two very 
important questions “why this vision…what’s in it for me, for those I serve, and for 
my organization?” (Adams, 2005).  There were several incentives to assess county’s 
motivations for changing preparedness planning.  Survey question 5 provided the 
basis to assess judge executive’s use of incentives to motivate change.  Those 
incentives were sense of threat, financial/grants available, community interest, and 
financial reward.  Of the 44 county judge executives that changed, 100 percent stated 
that incentives were used to motivate change.  Of those incentives, 50 percent 
indicated sense of threat as being used, 97.9 percent indicated the use of grants 
available and financial reward, and that 50 percent indicated that community interest 
was an incentive for motivating change.  What this means in the Managing Complex 
Change model is that there is not a lack of incentive for change so gradual change is 
not occurring.   
 
∆ Resources for Change 
 Do we have what we need to do the job well is an important question in 
defining resources for change.  Resources include materials or things like “program 
offerings, supplies, materials, equipment, space, funding, human capital, and certainly 
time,” (Adams, 2005).  Change may occur even without adequate resources but it will 
take longer and will usually result in frustration among those involved.  Based on the 
results of survey question 3e, 69.6 percent of county judges that changed are currently 
experiencing frustration.  That is because those judges indicated limited resources as 
a major barrier they must overcome to bring about change. 
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∆ Action Plan for Change 
 A typical action plan provides direction and structure that people need to 
fulfill the change process.  A well-conceived action plan, short- or long-term, will let 
“people know what their roles are, what they must do within those roles, by when, 
with whom, and how,” (Adams, 2005).  When an action plan is absent in the change 
process false starts will occur.  So far only 10.9 percent of the 44 county judge 
executives have experienced False Starts due to not having an action plan—84.8 
percent of judges have and are utilizing an action plan.  The use of action plans was 
based on respondents answer to survey question 31. 
∆ Wrap Up 
In assessing changes in emergency preparedness at the county level, the 
Managing Complex Change model indicates that of the 44 county judge executives 
that changed, 20.5 percent indicated that they had used and addressed all five steps in 
managing change.  According to the model successful change should have occurred 
in those counties but evidence of this is inconclusive. 
 
Counties that did NOT Change 
 
 Of the 76 county judges executive that responded to the survey, 30 county 
judge executives stated that they had not changed their emergency preparedness plans 
since the events of September 11, 2001.  Those judge executives that answered were 
assessed independently from the 44 judges that stated that change had occurred and 2 
respondents failed to answer the question.  For comparison these counties were 
placed into the Managing Complex Change model.  The two groups are also 
compared regarding their planning and training practices and their threat assessments.  
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Managing Complex Change 
 
∆ Vision for Change 
 The 30 judges that did not change, 53.3 percent do not have a long-term vision 
of the change process.  What this means is that if in terms of the Managing Complex 
Change model is that 53.3 percent of judge executives and employees within the 
county may be experiencing confusion. 
 
∆ Skills for Change 
 Of the 30 county judge executives only 30 percent indicated not having the 
necessary skills in changing their emergency response plans—70 percent had the 
necessary skills for change.  Thus, stress and anxiety felt among the judges and 
county employees may be minimal.   
 
∆ Incentives for Change 
 Among the 30 county judge executives that did not change, 96.7 percent 
stated that incentives were used to motivate change.  This is a strange concept—these 
judges believed they had not changed yet indicated the use of incentives in motivating 
change.  What this means is that the change to their emergency preparedness plans 
may have occurred prior to the events of 9/11 or that incentives were being used to 
motivate change but drastic change has not yet occurred. 
Of those incentives used 50 percent indicated a sense of threat being used, 90 
percent indicated the use of financial/grants available, 36.7 percent indicated that 
community interest was an incentive and that only 10 percent indicated the use of 
financial reward as an incentive for motivating change.  What this means in terms of 
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the Complex Change model is that there is not a lack of incentive so gradual change 
may not be occurring.   
 
∆ Resources for Change 
 Currently 70 percent of county judges that did not change may be 
experiencing frustration.  That is because those judges indicated limited resources as 
being a major barrier they have to overcome to bring about change.  What is unclear 
is if limited resources is responsible for these counties indicating that drastic change 
did not occur. 
 
∆ Action Plan for Change 
 When an action plan is absent in the change process false starts may occur as 
illustrated in Figure 3.  So far only 26.7 percent of the 30 county judge executives 
may have experienced false starts due to not having an action plan—70 percent of 
judges have and are utilizing an action plan of some kind.  This seems to be 
confusing.  If these results are of those county judge executives that believed they had 
not drastically changed their emergency preparedness plans since 9/11 how could 70 
percent have used an action plan?  This may be explained similarly to the incentives 
step already discussed.  These counties may have changed prior to 9/11 and utilized 
an action plan or they were using an action plan but may not have already drastically 
changed their emergency preparedness plans.  
 
Planning and Training 
  
 In comparing the two groups, there are some similarities and differences in 
their actions toward planning and training.  The two groups are similar in operational 
division of responsibility with the majority of counties reporting that their Director of 
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Emergency Response/Management is in charge of the county’s response to a terrorist 
attack or emergency.  Other similarities between the groups are in their emergency 
response practicing, use of outside help in practicing responses, and use of experts in 
working with their emergency response plans.   
 
 
Table 1    Percent that Practiced Responding 
Counties Practiced Used Non-County 
Personnel 
Used Expert 
Change 73.9 67.4 89.1 
No Change 70.0 56.7 80.0 
 
 The two groups also have some differences in their planning and training 
practices as indicated by Table 1.  In the counties that changed 71.7 percent of their 
first responders (fire and police) attend training, classes on terrorism, preparedness 
and new practices more than once a year.  Of the counties that did not change, only 
56 percent attend training and classes more than once a year.  This statistic shows an 
almost 15 percent difference in the level of training first responders are receiving in 
the counties that did not change.  This is unlike the counties that did change, which 
report that their first responders receiving training every two years or less at a rate of 
2.2 percent and 6.5 percent respectfully.  So while 71.1 percent of counties that did 
change, practice yearly, that statistic is overshadowed by their comparatively higher 
percentages of counties training less. Other differences exist between the two groups 
of counties in terms of how often they focus on emergency response planning in their 
day-to-day operations.  While the differences between the two groups may have 
occurred by chance because they are not statistically significant, reporting such 
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findings is helpful in understanding efforts to change emergency preparedness 
planning at the county government level.   
 
Table 2   Percentage that Focused on Emergency Response Planning 
Counties Daily Weekly Monthly Yearly Randomly 
Change  15.2 23.9 30.4 8.7 19.6 
No Change 16.7 30.0 16.7 20.0 16.7 
 
Table 2 illustrates that there are some similarities and difference between those 
counties that changed and those that did not.  While the groups are similar in the 
percentage of counties that focus of emergency response planning there are 
differences in those counties, which focus on planning yearly.  Of the counties that 
did change, only 8.7 percent focused on emergency planning yearly while 20.0 
percent of counties that did not change focused on planning on a yearly basis.  This 
demonstrates that those counties that did change are focusing and addressing issues of 
emergency preparedness more regularly than those counties that did not change.  
Threat Assessment 
 
 A threat assessment is an evaluation of the way in which people, businesses, 
property or infrastructure may be harmed, damaged or destroyed and the 
identification of those individuals and groups who may pose a threat, and the 
evaluation of the seriousness of such threats and the potential means.  All counties in 
this study were asked if they had completed a threat assessment for their county and 
71.7 percent of counties that changed and 66.7 percent of counties that did not change 
answered yes.  What is interesting is that 82.6 percent of counties that changed and 83 
percent of counties that did not change believe they are prepared for most emergency 
situations.  While both groups believe they are prepared for most emergency 
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situations neither group believes that they are prepared extremely well for a terrorist 
attack; which demonstrates that most county leaders separate the two types of 
emergency situations.  Of counties that changed, only 45.7 percent believed that they 
were prepared for a terrorist attack and in the counties that did not change only 26.7 
percent believed they were prepared for a terrorist attack.  While those counties that 
did change are almost double that of those that did not change in regards to 
preparedness for a terrorist attack, both groups are prepared at a relatively low 
percentage.  Table 3 helps further demonstrate that those counties that changed 
appear to be more prepared for a terrorist attack than those counties that did not 
change because it breaks down the various types of terrorism and ranks each groups 
responses by least prepared and most prepared.  
Table 3 Change      No Change 
Type 
of Terror 
Least 
Prepared 
Most Prepared Type 
of Terror 
Least 
Prepared 
Most 
Prepared 
Chemical & 
Hazardous 
8.6 percent 
 
63 percent Chemical & 
Hazardous 
16.7 percent 53.4 percent 
Biological 
Agents 
28.2 percent 30.4 percent Biological 
Agents 
46.7 percent 20 percent 
Bombings 54 percent 10.9 percent Bombings 53.3 percent 13.3 percent 
Radiological 52.2 percent 15.2 percent Radiological 56.7 percent 3.3 percent 
Agricultural 41.3 percent 15.2 percent Agricultural 50 percent 16.6 percent 
Hostage 
Taking 
23.9 percent 30.4 percent Hostage 
Taking 
50 percent 26.7 percent 
Financial 45.7 percent 15.2 percent Financial  53.3 percent 6.7 percent 
**Note: Percentages for the ranking were combined (Respondents which ranked their preparedness 
level as a 0 or 1 were combined, the same is true for those that ranked preparedness as a 3 or 4).  
Counties, which ranked preparedness at level 2, were excluded.  
 
 Most would believe that those counties that did not change would be 
overwhelmingly less prepared for various types of terror compared to those counties 
that did change.  While this is true of some types of terror, Table 3 indicates that 
those counties that did not change appear to be more prepared for terrorist bombing 
and agricultural attacks than those counties that changed.   
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Logistic Regression Analysis 
  
 The logistic (dummy variable) regression analysis yielded several interesting 
and important results.  The first most important result was the rate at which the model 
was able to predict that change in the dependent variable would occur based on the 
variations in the independent variables.   
Table 4 
 
Classification Table
19 9 67.9
7 26 78.8
73.8
Observed 
no
yes
drastically 
changed 
Overall 
Step 1 
no yes
drastically Percentage
Correct 
Predicted 
 
As Table 4 indicates, the regression model predicted that drastic change will occur 
73.8 percent of the time given the various independent variables. (See page 22 for 
description of independent variables) 
∆ Levels of Significance 
When analyzing whether or not counties had drastically changed their 
emergency response plans, three independent variables proved to be significant at the 
0.05 level.  Significance level shows how likely a result is due to chance.  A 0.05 
significance level means that the results of this study have a 95 percent or higher 
possibility of the relationship being true and that the relationship is unlikely to have 
occurred by chance.  The variables that had a 0.05 significance level this study were 
‘Mitigation Practices’, ‘the level of resistance to change’ experienced and the 
‘Western region.’ 
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Table 5     Variables in the Equation 
Independent 
Variables 
B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Mitigation P. 
Political B. 
Level Resist 
In Charge 
Vision 
Personnel 
Bluegrass 
Western 
Eastern 
0.108 
-1.489 
-0.612 
0.632 
-0.028 
-0.023 
-2.090 
-2.820 
-2.216 
0.048 
0.967 
0.313 
0.377 
0.016 
0.014 
1.124 
1.290 
1.129
4.948 
2.369 
3.821 
2.817 
2.898 
2.479 
3.460 
4.780 
3.663
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.026 
0.124 
0.051 
0.093 
0.089 
0.115 
0.063 
0.029 
0.056 
1.114 
0.226 
0.542 
1.882 
0.972 
0.978 
0.124 
0.060 
0.115
*Independent Variables defined in Methods section pg.# 
 
Table 5 shows that the variable ‘Mitigation Practices’ was significant at a value of 
0.026, the ‘Western region’ at 0.029 and the ‘level of resistance to change’ at 0.051, 
which is just at the 0.05 significance level.  The variable ‘Mitigation Practices’ was, 
as mentioned in the methodology section of this capstone, created by combining 
eighteen other independent variables using Cronbach’s Alpha test and the variable 
SUM function in the SPSS statistical software.  With the significance level of 0.026 
the variable ‘Mitigation Practices,’ there is a 98.4 percent possibility that its 
relationship to the dependent variable (drastic change) is true and did not occur by 
chance.  This means that the variable ‘Mitigation Practices’ may explain why some 
counties drastically changed their emergency response plans while other counties did 
not.  Similarly the ‘Western region’ variable has a 98.1 percent possibility that being 
in or not being a county in the western region of Kentucky may explain why drastic 
change may or may not have occurred.  There is a 94.9 percent possibility that the 
‘level of resistance to change’ experienced by counties may explain why counties 
drastically changed or did not drastically change their emergency response planning.   
There were four independent variables that were significant at a level of 0.10.  
This means that there was a 90 percent or higher possibility of their relationships 
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being true and that their relationships are unlikely to have occurred by chance.  Those 
variables were ‘person in charge’ at a value of 0.093, ‘vision’ at a value of 0.089, 
‘Bluegrass’ at a value of 0.063, and ‘Eastern’ at a value of 0.056.  The variable 
‘person in charge’ measured what county leader (judge executive, director of 
emergency response, police chief/sheriff, fire chief or other) was in charge of the 
counties response following an emergency. At a 0.093 level of significance drastic 
changes to the emergency response plans in a county and the person in charge of 
planning the relationship may not be caused by chance.  Similarly, there is 91.1 
percent possibility that the relationship between having a long-term written vision of 
where the counties would like their emergency response planning to be and whether 
or not drastic change to those plans occurred may be true.  There is also a chance that 
the relationship of being in either the ‘Bluegrass’ (93.7%) or ‘Eastern’ (94.4%) 
regions of Kentucky and drastically changing county emergency response planning 
may be true.  Having three independent variables at 95 percent and four independent 
variables at 90 percent significance level is important in helping to reject the null 
hypothesis proposed in this capstone.  The null hypothesis is that matters relating to 
Homeland Security do not drive the need to change emergency response preparedness 
at the county government level.  It is important to rejecting the null hypothesis 
because the significance levels demonstrate that matters relating to Homeland 
Security do appear to account for changes in the dependent variable among 
respondents. 
  
∆ Coefficients 
C. Cross 
 
40
SECURING THE COMMONWEALTH 
 As a matter of course, the degree to which independent variables are related to 
the dependent variable is expressed in the correlation coefficient R, which is the 
square root of R-square.  In regressions, R can assume values between 0 and 1.  To 
interpret the direction of the relationship between variables, look at the signs (plus or 
minus) of the regression or B coefficients.  If a B coefficient is positive, then the 
relationship of this variable with the dependent variable is positive; if the B 
coefficient is negative then the relationship is negative (Johnson, 2001, p.409).  Of 
course, if the B coefficient is equal to 0 then there is no relationship between the 
variables.   
Table 6 
Independent 
Variable 
B 
Mitigation P. 
Political B. 
Level Resist 
In Charge 
Vision 
Personnel 
Bluegrass 
Western 
Eastern 
0.108 
-1.489 
-0.612 
0.632 
-0.028 
-0.023 
-2.090 
-2.820 
-2.216
 
Looking at the variables in the in Table 6 one can see the regression B coefficients for 
each of the independent variables utilized.  The regression coefficients reveal the 
nature of the relationships between the dependent and independent variables.  It is 
important to keep in mind that each coefficient is influenced by the other variables in 
the regression model.  Two or more variables may explain the same variation in the 
dependent variable.  Therefore, each coefficient does not explain the total effect on 
the dependent variable of its corresponding variable, as it would if it were the only 
variable in the model.  From Table 6 one can see that four independent variables do 
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not fall between 0 and 1: ‘Political Barriers,’ ‘Bluegrass,’ ‘Western,’ and ‘Eastern’ 
regions so their relationship cannot be determined.  The independent variable 
‘Mitigation Practices’ has a coefficient of 0.018, which is positive.  This means that 
the greater the ‘Mitigation Practices’ are the chance of counties drastically changing 
their emergency response plans gets better. The variable ‘person in charge’ also had a 
positive relationship.  According to this relationship there is a better chance that 
drastic change to emergency planning will occur depending on the person in charge 
of responding to an emergency.   
 The variable ‘level of resistance’ has a negative coefficient -0.612.  This 
means that as the level of resistance to change experienced decreases the likeliness 
that drastic changes to emergency response plans will occur.  Surprisingly the 
variable ‘vision’ had a negative relationship meaning that the less likely that counties 
had a long-term written vision of their emergency planning the more likely those 
counties were to drastically change their emergency response plan.  While this is a 
surprising result it does not measure the success of that drastic change in overcoming 
the resisting forces of change.   
 If you look at the coefficients you will see that the regional values are all 
negative.  What this tells us is that of the four regions plus the Pennyrile (the default 
region) that the data was collected from, counties located in the Pennyrile region are 
more likely to have drastically changed their emergency response plans based on the 
influence of the independent variables.   
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 Based on the results of this study there are some conclusions about 
organizational change and emergency response planning to be made. This study 
demonstrates that change in the dependent variable (drastic change to emergency 
response plans) can be explained 73.8 percent of the time by the independent 
variables (‘Mitigation Practices,’ ‘level of resistance to change,’ ‘person in charge of 
emergency response,’ long-term vision,’ ‘political barriers,’ and ‘regional location’); 
thus rejecting the null hypothesis.  The null hypothesis stated that Homeland Security 
does not drive the need to change emergency response preparedness at the county 
government level.  There were two research questions initially proposed by this 
research.  Those questions were: 
 1. Has change in emergency response planning occurred at the county level? 
 2. Are there regional differences present in terms of organizational change 
 and emergency response planning?  
 
 For the most part, based on the research conducted, change in emergency 
response planning has occurred at the county level in Kentucky answering the first 
research question.  44 county judge executives stated that they had drastically 
changed their county’s emergency response plans since the events of 9/11. It is 
important to point out that less than half of the respondents indicated that no change 
occurred.  This presents two very interesting questions for this study and also for the 
state and federal Departments of Homeland Security.  What caused 30 county judge 
executives to not drastically change?   What can influence or bring about change in 
those counties?  
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 The results of the logistic regression analysis reveal that there are regional 
differences present in terms of organizational change and emergency response 
planning which answers the second research question.  Counties in the Pennyrile 
region are more likely to have drastically changed their emergency response plans 
based on the influence of the independent variables which all relate to increasing 
emergency response.  Counties regional location may also help explain why or why 
not drastic change to emergency response planning occurred in a particular county.  
There is a 98.1 percent (0.05 level of significance) possibility that being in or not 
being a county in the western region of Kentucky may explain why drastic change 
may or may not have occurred.  Similarly, at a point 0.10 level of significance the 
relationship of being in either the Bluegrass (93.7 percent) or Eastern (94.4 percent) 
regions of Kentucky and drastically changing county emergency response planning 
may be true.  Like the findings of the first research question the findings of the 
second research question leave some important questions that need to be asked.  Are 
there reasons some regions are changing their response plans more than the others? 
Had counties in the different regions drastically changed their emergency response 
plans prior to the events of 9/11?  Does the existence or the lack there of, make 
drastic change to emergency response planning more or less likely to occur in a 
particular region?  It is by way of these questions that this study can make 
recommendations to emergency planners everywhere on how to successfully bring 
about change.  
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Recommendations 
The first recommendation the need for further research to be conducted.  As 
the questions that were just posed pointed out, this project was not able to explain the 
regional differences or verify if change to emergency response plans had actually 
taken place.  Further research needs to take into account the presence or lack there of, 
of possible terrorist targets that could help explain why the regional differences 
occurred.  Further research needs to be done to compare pre- and post-9/11 county 
emergency response plans in Kentucky to obtain a better understanding of what 
changes are taking place.  Research also needs to be conducted upon county 
employees individual attitudes toward changing emergency response plans to fully 
understand the resistance forces working against efforts to bring about change. 
The second recommendation is to focus emergency response planning as an 
organizational change problem and to utilize different planned change models for 
different change agents.  As this study has demonstrated using the Managing 
Complex Change model there were only 20.5 percent of counties that believed they 
had drastically changed and in fact were utilizing all five steps in the model.  Change 
agents at the county level could utilize this model because it allows them to see what 
aspects of planned change are necessary to make change occur and prevent poor 
outcomes of changing.   
While the events of September 11, 2001, created a sense of urgency to change 
preparedness at the federal government there has been no substantial urgency placed 
on the county government level.  This is because many county governments believe 
they are unlikely to be a target of terrorism.  This is why recognizing that improving 
homeland security at the county level is an organizational change problem is 
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important.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can act as a change agent 
and attempt to utilize driving forces and resisting forces to offset counties’ 
equilibriums and bring about change. 
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Regions of the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
 
BLUEGRASS   PENNYRILE  WESTERN  EASTERN 
ANDERSON   ADAIR   BALLARD  BATH 
BOONE   ALLEN   BULITT  BELL 
BOURBON   BARREN   BUTLER  BOYD 
BOYLE   BRECKINRIDGE   CARLISE  BREATHITT 
BRACKEN   CALDWELL   DAVIESS  CARTER 
CARROLL   CASEY   EDMONSON  CLAY 
CLARK   CHRISTIAN   FULTON  ELLIOTT 
FAYETTE   CLINTON   GRAVES  ESTILL 
FLEMING   CRITTENDEN   GRAYSON  FLOYD 
FRANKLIN   CUMBERLAND   HANCOCK  GREENUP 
GALLATIN   GREEN   HENDERSON  HARLAN 
GARRARD   HARDIN   HICKMAN  JACKSON 
GRANT   HART   HOPKINS  JOHNSON 
HARRISON   LARUE   MCCRACKEN  KNOTT 
HENRY   LIVINGSTON   MCLEAN  KNOX 
JEFFERSON   LOGAN   MARION  LAUREL 
JESSAMINE   LYON   MARSHALL  LAWRENCE 
KENTON   MEADE   MUHLENBERG  LEE 
MASON   METCALFE   OHIO  LESLIE 
MERCER   MONROE   UNION  LETCHER 
MONTGOMERY   NELSON   WARREN  LEWIS 
NICHOLAS   PULASKI   WEBSTER  LINCOLN 
OLDHAM   RUSSELL     MCCREARY 
OWEN   SIMPSON     MADISON 
PENDLETON   TAYLOR     MAGOFFIN 
ROBERTSON   TODD     MARTIN 
SCOTT   TRIGG     MENIFEE 
SHELBY        MORGAN 
SPENCER        OWSLEY 
TRIMBLE        PERRY 
WASHINGTON        PIKE 
WOODFORD        POWELL 
        ROCKCASTLE 
        ROWAN 
        WAYNE 
        WHITLEY 
        WOLFE 
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